INTRODUCTION
The Government's authority to impose taxes is one of its most pervasive and fundamental powers.' In the United States, this power is granted to Congress by the U.S. Constitution with few explicit restrictions. 2 Moreover, the courts in the United States almost invariably affirm the Government's power to tax in the face of constitutional challenges. 3 This "presumption of constitutionality" afforded most tax legislation is a long-standing and well-accepted proposition. 4 As a result, constitutional law has played a relatively minor role in the development of tax laws in the United States.
While many questions arise from the intersection between constitutional law and federal and state taxing power, most are not answered by the litigated cases. Our goal is not to raise possible constitutional claims, but instead to provide an overview of how courts in the United States have applied constitutional limitations to federal and state taxing power so that others may make relevant comparisons with tax systems in other countries. Space limitations require selective treatment of the subject rather than a comprehensive analysis.
Parts I and II outline the basic legal protections afforded by the U.S. Constitution and explain the process by which tax legislation in the United States is enacted and administered. Part III focuses on challenges to tax legislation based on fundamental rights such as freedom of religion and freedom of speech. Parts IV and V raise the question of whether vertical and horizontal equity, tax policy goals widely used by policymakers to measure fairness in a tax system, are constitutionally required in the United States. The remaining parts of the article examine constitutional questions arising from the tax treatment of families (Part VI), the relationships between separate taxing authorities (Part VII), the legislature's authority to enact retroactive tax legislation (Part VIII), and the validity of tax benefits aimed at specific taxpayers (Part IX).
PART I: FUNDAMENTAL PROTECTIONS OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES
In the United States, the ultimate protection of fundamental rights and individual liberties stems from the U.S. Constitution. 5 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, respectively, provide that neither the United States nor any State shall divest any person "of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . ." 6 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment ensures that the federal government will not deny an individual any of the freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, 7 including the rights of free exercise of religion, assembly, and speech." The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause has been interpreted to incorporate most of the fundamental protections of the Bill of Rights to prevent State governments from infringing on an individual's rights. 9 Due process also entails particular safeguards to ensure fairness when divesting a person of their "life, liberty or property," including the requirements of notice, 10 hearing," and an independent decision maker.12 5. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND Policies 456 (2d ed. 2002). The Constitution was ratified without the Bill of Rights. At the request of the States, amendments were drafted to enumerate and protect certain rights. Ten of these were ratified by the States and became the Bill of Rights. Id.
6. U.S. CONsT. amend. V; amend. XIV, § 1. 7. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 5 (citation omitted). 8. U.S. CONsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.").
9. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 478-84. The Fourteenth Amendment further guarantees that no person will be denied "equal protection" under the law. 13 This equal protection guarantee has been widely used by courts since the 1950s to protect fundamental rights from State and federal infringement. 14 The Constitution also protects rights that are not explicit, such as the right to marry, 15 the right to privacy, 16 and the right to procreate.17 Although, in general, the Constitution only regulates government action, 18 the U.S. Congress has passed several laws under its Commerce Clause power that prevent private individuals and companies from abusing the rights and liberties of others.' 9 Moreover, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV guarantees that the fundamental rights enjoyed by a citizen of a State shall not be denied to a nonresident of that State. 20 State actions are legitimate as a matter of federal constitutional law if not forbidden explicitly or implicitly by the Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court is the ultimate interpreter of constitutional rights in the United States. It has original jurisdiction over cases dealing with, inter alia, ambassadors, public officials, and those in which a State is a party. 22 The Supreme Court also has expansive appellate jurisdiction, subject to Congress's discretion. 23 Congress 13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
14. The Supreme Court has also required equal protection guarantees of the federal government through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-99 (1954 has granted the lower federal courts concurrent jurisdiction, even over those areas where the Constitution specifies that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction. 2 4 Thus, the lower courts have jurisdiction to evaluate constitutional issues, subject to Supreme Court review. 25 Although the Constitution never explicitly grants the federal courts the authority to examine the constitutionality of federal or State laws or executive actions, 26 Regulations promulgated by the Treasury Department are an important source when interpreting the IRC and are generally considered to carry the force and effect of law.
4 4 The IRS is primarily responsible for administering the federal tax laws and collecting tax liability. 45 The Agency also has the authority to issue published guidance, such as Revenue Rulings and Revenue Procedures, that helps taxpayers interpret the meaning of a particular statutory provision. 4 pronouncements from the IRS less weight than Treasury regulations.
7
If a taxpayer seeks to litigate a tax controversy, he or she may do so in one of three initial choices of venue. 48 In the U.S. Tax Court, the taxpayer does not have to pay the tax liability in question before going to trial and there is no jury. 4 9 Appeals from the Tax Court go to the Circuit Court of Appeals where the plaintiff resided or had a principal place of business when the Tax Court petition was filed. 5 0 The other two trial-level forum choices are the federal district courts, with appeals taken to the appropriate circuit, and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, with appeals taken to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 5 1 In these two latter venues, the taxpayer must first pay the tax liability and then seek a refund. 52 Either party may request review by the U.S. Supreme Court of any appellate decision. 5 3 However, the Supreme Court is not required to hear all cases that are appealed 54 and generally decides few tax cases. 5 5 PART III: RAISING CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO U.S. TAx LAWS United States taxpayers wishing to raise constitutional challenges to tax laws need not enlist the support of an administrator or administrative agency in order to advance their challenges in court. 5 6 Some of the most persistent constitutional challenges arise from the tax protestor movement, which, among other goals, seeks to invalidate the entire IRC. Courts frequently reject as frivolous claims by tax protestors that the federal income tax is invalid because, for in- Constitutional challenges to specific provisions of the tax law are less frequent, but certainly not uncommon. As explained in Part V, courts tend to validate tax law provisions even when they create disparities among similarly situated taxpayers. 5 9 This is due, in part, to the judiciary's treatment of tax issues as affecting property rights, which receive less constitutional protection than fundamental personal rights and liberties, 6 0 and to the judiciary's willingness to defer to the legislature on tax issues. 6 1 Even when taxpayers base their constitutional challenges on those affirmative rights typically examined with a greater degree of scrutiny -religious freedom and free speech -case law reveals that courts still generally defer to the will of the legislature. The discussion below examines the courts' approaches to tax law challenges based on the First Amendment's free exercise, establishment, and free speech clauses, 6 2 as well as challenges arising from allegations of race and gender discrimination.
Taxpayers have challenged tax laws and sought refunds based on the First Amendment's prohibition against laws respecting the establishment of religion and restricting the free exercise thereof. As a general rule, income and sales taxes of general applicability have been held not to infringe on a person's right to free exercise of religion.
6 3 As one federal court stated: "Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the Congress from levying a tax upon all persons, regardless of religion, for support of the general government." 6 4 However, the Su- 805 (2001) (admitting that, under the current state of the law, the constitutionality of tax benefits for religious institutions depends on benefits to secular entities, but challenging that conclusion). fared more poorly. For example, the Supreme Court has ruled that a sales tax exemption granted only to publications promulgating the teaching of religious faith violated the Establishment Clause because, according to the Court, the exemption had the effect of advancing religious belief and appeared, on its face, to entangle church and State. 7 1
The Court's differential treatment of uniformly applied tax benefits that extend to religious organizations and tax benefits targeted exclusively for sectarian purposes is also evident in cases involving deductions for educational expenses. For example, a State law allowing taxpayers to deduct tuition and related expenses of dependents attending either sectarian or nonsectarian schools was held not to violate the First Amendment, 72 while a tax deduction for educational expenses incurred at nonpublic schools was declared unconstitutional. 7 3 In the latter case, the legislature granted the deduction for expenses related to "nonpublic" education, rather than more narrowly tailoring the benefits towards religious or sectarian schools. Nevertheless, because, in actual operation, the tax benefit flowed primarily to parents who sent children to sectarian schools, the Court held that the deduction was not sufficiently restricted so as to assure that it would not have the effect of impermissibly advancing the activities of religious organizations. In the area of free speech, the Court has held that tax legislation that infringes on rights such as freedom of the press and free expression guaranteed by the First Amendment will be upheld as long as the tax serves a compelling government interest. 7 5 The fact that the tax imposes an incidental burden on free speech rights does not make it unconstitutional. Thus, imposing a form of taxation upon newspaper and other press outlets that is also applicable to other businesses does not, according to the Supreme Court, amount to an unconstitutional infringement of First Amendment rights. 7 6 When a State use tax singled out newspapers and did not apply to other business entities, however, the Supreme Court held the tax unconstitutional. The Court found that the State's general interest in raising sufficient revenue was not a compelling one and also expressed concern that a 71. tax only on the press could suppress freedom of expression, a goal the Court declared to be "presumptively unconstitutional."' 7 Tax laws that vary based on the content of the published material are more likely to be declared unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 7 9 Concerns that tax laws may discriminate on the basis of content have led the Supreme Court to hold that a State sales tax on general interest magazines, with an exemption for religious, professional, or trade magazines, violated the First Amendment. 8 0 Although the Court found no motive on the part of the legislature to censure any particular viewpoint, 8 1 the Court characterized the State tax scheme as "particularly repugnant" to First Amendment principles because the amount of tax depended entirely on the magazine's content. When a tax will be considered content-based and when it will not is unclear. In a related case, the Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to a State sales tax that applied to cable television services but not to print media. Although the tax discriminated among media outlets, the Court held that such discrimination does not implicate the First Amendment unless it is predicated on the basis of ideas.82 Because the statute itself did not refer to the content of media communications, and the outlets subject to the tax presented a wide array of viewpoints, the Court found that the sales tax system was not content-based. While academics frequently maintain that different features of the tax code result in racial or sexual discrimination against targeted groups, 8 4 constitutional challenges to tax provisions based on race or on sex discrimination are relatively rare. The few challenges alleging that a tax provision unfairly discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation have arisen mostly in the context of the disparate tax treatment of married couples and couples in same-sex unions. 8 5 As explained in Part VI, courts have rejected most of these challenges on the ground that a systematic bias against a particular group did not exist. 
See infra text accompanying notes 168-74.
One of the most prominent cases involving the intersection of race and tax law is Bob Jones University v. United States. 8 7 In this case, the Supreme Court upheld a decision by the IRS to revoke the tax exemption granted under IRC section 501(c)(3) to a private university that prohibited interracial dating among its students. The Court's holding rested on statutory grounds; specifically, that racially discriminatory policies in education violated "established public policy" and prevented the school from being a "charitable" organization. 8 8 In reaching its holding, the Court rejected the taxpayers' arguments that denial of their school's tax-exempt status violated their First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion. 9 According to the Court, the denial of tax benefits may adversely affect the school, but would not prevent the taxpayers from observing their religious beliefs. Moreover, the government's interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education overrides those concerns. 9 0 PART IV: ADVANCING THE GOALS OF VERTICAL EQUITY Policymakers and politicians agree that fairness in a tax system is more than just a theoretical ideal; it is an important structural goal. 9 ' Fairness, in the tax context, is usually expressed with reference to two standards: horizontal equity and vertical equity. 9 2 Vertical equity, as a broad concept, connotes a tax system that appropriately distinguishes among taxpayers in different economic circumstances. 9 3 The concept of vertical equity is typically discussed in the context of the progressivity debate: Should taxpayers with more income should pay a greater percentage of that income as tax when compared with those who have less income? Progressivity in the U.S. tax system is achieved in a number of ways, including through the graduated rate structure. 96 Tax scholars who oppose a progressive tax system state that it complicates the tax code, encourages tax avoidance schemes, and discourages productivity. 9 7 Other scholars argue that the progressive income tax is beneficial to society 98 and can be viewed as more equitable because a dollar has less "value" for a high-income taxpayer than a low-income taxpayer. 9 9 Income inequality in the United States and the difficulty in improving economic standing for those in the lower echelons of society further argue for a system of progressive taxation. 100 The debate today between those for and against progressive taxation dates back to the 1913 income tax act, thus it is not surprising that challenges to the progressive tax system have taken place. 101
Soon after the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment,1 02 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a progressive income tax was constitutional in the face of a Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause challenge. (1964) . "It is now well settled that the income tax laws are not unconstitutional under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, nor are they unconstitutionally defective because of discriminatory progressive tax rates." Id. at 98 (citations omitted).
108. Quarty v. United States, 170 F.3d 961, 967 (9th Cir. 1999). 109. A possible challenge that could succeed would be a tax that was "so wanting in basis for classification as to produce such a gross and patent inequality as to inevitably lead to the same conclusion," that it was not a tax but a confiscation of property and therefore in violation of the Fifth Amendment. held some States' graduated flat license taxes on corporations where they were able to demonstrate a rational basis for the tax."1 5 Another feature of the U.S. tax system that is consistent with the goal of vertical equity is the personal exemption. The IRC allows each individual to claim, in the form of a deduction, a personal exemption of a specified amount for himself, a spouse, and each child.1 16 This exemption effectively allows a corresponding amount of income to be taxed at a zero rate." 7 Although it is categorized as a deduction, in actuality, the personal exemption is part of the overall graduated tax structure.11 8 In the United States, both political parties support these exemptions because personal exemptions acknowledge that the amount needed for subsistence of an individual who provides for a spouse and dependents is greater than the amount needed for a single individual."1 9 The personal exemptions are phased-out when a taxpayer meets a threshold income amount. Thus, high-income taxpayers do not receive the benefit of this "zero bracket amount."1 2 0
Prior to 1984, one of the recurring problems with the personal exemption was the failure to index the amount to the rate of inflation The classification is not arbitrary, but in its normal operation has a rational relation to the subject matter to be taxed, the capacity to pay, and the justice of the payment."); State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 541-42 (1931) (holding that a graduated licensing fee, the effect of which was to tax chains at a higher rate than individually owned stores, was constitutional because there are advantages to operating chain stores as opposed to individual stores and thus the classification is rational). or the average increase in personal incomes. 1 2 1 In Crowe v. Comm ssioner,1 2 2 a taxpayer challenged the amount of the personal exemption by arguing that it was insufficient for his cost of living and was otherwise inequitable.1 23 The Eighth Circuit, affirming the Tax Court decision, held that it was without authority to grant relief to the petitioner because the personal exemption was enacted as a "matter of legislative grace." Therefore, courts are powerless to increase the amount of the exemption.
12 4 Similarly, a taxpayer who attempted to deduct his living expenses was barred by the IRS from doing so. Another standard used by policymakers to measure fairness under the tax laws is the notion of horizontal equity. Horizontal equity calls for legislators to impose equal tax burdens on similarly situated taxpayers. While most commentators agree that horizontal equity is a worthy goal of a tax system, 12 7 the IRC is replete with cases in which administrative and other factors trump the concern for equality of treatment.128 The exclusion for employee fringe benefits, for instance, creates horizontal inequity, yet the exclusion exists, in large part, because of Congress's desire to avoid the administrative burden of seeking to tax small amounts.1 
2006]
Some commentators maintain that horizontal equity is grounded in constitutional norms.o 3 0 The Uniformity Clause in Article I Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, which mandates that taxes and levies "shall be uniform throughout the United States," would appear, on its face, to express some concern for equality of treatment.' 3 ' However, in defining uniformity under Article I, the Supreme Court has interpreted the limitation to allow Congress wide discretion to draw distinctions between what receipts should or should not be taxed and at what rates. In fact, the Court's position seems to be that the Uniformity Clause concerns only geographic uniformity, in the sense that any given tax system adopted by Congress must operate the same throughout the United States.1 32 Thus, allegations that the federal income tax violated the Uniformity Clause because the incidence of the tax varied among taxpayers based on the differential application of State property law have been rejected.'
The principle of horizontal equity would also seem to be an inherent part of the U.S. Constitution's equal protection guarantee. Early on, however, the Supreme Court downplayed the role of due process and equal protection challenges as a mean of limiting the legislature's power to enact tax laws.1 3 4 The Court's reluctance to second guess a legislature's decision has led it to establish a high threshold in order to find a tax provision unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. According to the Court:
[I]n taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification. ... [Tlhe presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes. The burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negate every conceivable basis which might support it.1 3 5 amining in some depth the interaction among horizontal equity, economic efficiency, and simplicity concerns).
130. See Musgrave, supra note 127, at 113 ("Not only does [horizontal equity] offer protection against discrimination but it also reflects the basic principle of equal worth."). But see Martinez, supra note 91, at 428-33 (arguing that, as a matter of constitutional law, notions of fairness do not play a role in judicial review of Congress's taxing power).
131. See Bittker, supra note 34, at 10 ("A broad reading of the uniformity clause ... would not only have rendered exemptions and differential tax rates unconstitutional, but it might well have invalidated . . . a host of other provisions that make up the warp and woof of the Internal Revenue Code.").
132. See [Vol. 54
Based on this standard, the Court has ruled that Congress may permissibly grant a tax subsidy to one group of taxpayers without granting it to all, so long as the distinction among groups is not based on a suspect classification.' 3 6 Similarly, the Court has rejected an equal protection challenge to a State property tax law that allowed long-term property owners to pay less tax than newer owners of comparable properties.
1 3 7 As evidence of the Court's extreme unwillingness to question State action on equal protection grounds, the Majority concluded its opinion in the property tax case with the following statement: The "Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted." 1 3 s This is not to say that an equal protection challenge to income tax legislation could never prevail under the "hostile or oppressive" standard set forth above. One example stands out. In Moritz v. Commissioner,1 39 the taxpayer, an unmarried man, challenged on equal protection grounds an income tax deduction for dependent care expenses available to women regardless of their marital status, but not available to men who had never married. Acknowledging the broad powers of the legislature to make classifications under the tax law, the Tenth Circuit nonetheless found that the deduction discriminated on the basis of sex.1 4 0 In doing so, the court rejected the Government's claim that the limitation was justified on the grounds that Congress intended the deduction to benefit women, who have traditionally had lower-paying jobs.141 Outside of clear cases of discrimination such as Moritz, however, horizontal equity, as one noted commentator has concluded, has "failed to find a constitutional voice."1 fit certain family structures. 143 The tax rates on any given dollar of income depend upon which category applies to the taxpayer. 144 The married filing jointly status provides an opportunity for "income splitting" between spouses because the rate schedule for married filing jointly has wider tax brackets than those for single taxpayers.1 4 5
Surviving spouses may avail themselves of the same rate schedule as married filing jointly.1 4 6 Recognizing the additional financial burden of raising children, the head of household status provides a different rate schedule to reduce overall tax liability for those who are eligible.1 47 Married couples may elect to file jointly or separately.
148 Federal income tax rate schedules provide either a benefit or a penalty for married taxpayers filing jointly depending primarily on whether they are a one-earner or a two-earner couple. Congress has alleviated the "marriage penalty" for lower-income taxpayers by increasing the standard deduction available to married couples to double that of single taxpayers and widening the 10% and 15% tax brackets so they are twice as wide for married couples as for single taxpayers. I.R.C. § § 63(c)(2) (A) -(C), 1(f)(8) . These provisions expire after December 31, 2010. Working Families Tax Relief Act of married couples filing separately are half as wide as those for married couples filing jointly.1 5 0 Married filing separately tax rates can be higher for a given dollar of income than the rates applicable to single individuals, thus married filing separately is the least desirable filing status.'
5 '
Marriage for all federal statutes (including the IRC) is limited to legal unions between a man and a woman as husband and wife.1
52
The IRC does provide income tax benefits for some alternate family situations, however. For example, a married individual who does not live with his or her spouse for the last six months of the tax year and who provides more than half of the support for a qualifying individual may elect head of household filing status, a status otherwise limited to a single taxpayer with dependents.1 53 The Tax Court has reviewed and rejected the few constitutional challenges to the head of household filing status that have been raised.' 155. Zelenak, supra note 149, at 6; Brown, supra note 149, at 288-89 (explaining that a two-earner couple with similar incomes pay more than if they were filing individually but a couple with one income earner saves money filing jointly).
156. Court struck down the Wisconsin statute in Hoeper, it has yet to rule on the constitutionality of the federal marriage penalty. 16 0 Lower courts, however, have grappled with the issue of whether the marriage penalty is constitutionally suspect. The marriage penalty is largest when both spouses earn relatively equal amounts of income. 16 1 In this situation, the tax paid by the married couple exceeds the tax they would have paid if they were unmarried and each filed as a single taxpayer.1 6 2 The IRC rate schedules were challenged in Johnson v. United States as unconstitutional because they infringed on a couple's fundamental right to marriage.' 6 3 The Northern District Court of Indiana held that the federal statute setting forth the tax rates did not impermissibly infringe on their right to marry because the couple could elect to file jointly or separately.164 The Second Circuit, when presented with a challenge to the federal rate schedule for the married filing separately status, held that applying different rate schedules to single and married taxpayers did not violate the Constitution.1 6 5 The Eighth Circuit also rejected a claim arising from a single taxpayer who challenged the constitutionality of a federal statute that prohibited her from filing jointly because she was not married.1 66 More recently, a New Jersey court rejected a constitutional challenge to a State law that required married couples filing their federal income tax return jointly to also file their New Jersey income tax return jointly.1 6 7
As noted above, marriage for federal tax purposes is limited to a union between one woman and one man. In Mueller v. Commissioner, a same-sex couple argued that the IRC infringed on their constitutional right to marry because it precluded them from using the 160. "The joint-return system makes one spouse liable for tax on the other spouse's income, but any constitutional objection is vitiated by the fact that a spouse can always avoid that result by electing to file a separate return. married filing jointly status. 168 The Seventh Circuit held that the eligibility for joint filing status resulted from a couple's decision to marry. Because this couple was not married in their own State, the filing status did not preclude them from marrying and, therefore, did not impinge on a right protected by the Constitution.1 6 9
Although the U.S. Supreme Court uses a heightened scrutiny standard to determine the constitutionality of laws restricting or banning marriage,1 70 the Court has never ruled that the right to marry extends to same-sex couples.1 71 While some States extend civil unions to same-sex couples,1 7 2 the federal government does not.' 7 3 The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) makes it impossible for a couple, even in a State recognizing same-sex marriage, to be considered married for federal income tax purposes.1 74 Any challenge to the constitutionality of DOMA barring a same-sex married couple from filing jointly would have to come from a State where same-sex marriage is legal.' 7 5 In the few cases challenging the constitutionality of DOMA, courts have upheld the Act.1 7 6
PART VII: SEPARATE TAXING AUTHORITIES As noted in Part II, the federal government's power to tax derives from the U.S. Constitution. Each of the fifty States also retains the power to tax and may delegate that authority to political subdivisions of the State, such as counties and cities.' 7 7 The taxing power of any State extends to all persons, property, and businesses within its jurisdiction.17 8 The federal government and most States tax income, but, unlike most States, the federal government does not impose a general sales tax.' 7 9 In some instances the taxing power of the federal government conflicts with that of a State, leading to constitutional challenges under the General Welfare Clause' 8 0 and the Tenth Amendment.' 8 ' Questions involving a State's authority to tax transactions and taxpayers within its borders have led to constitutional challenges implicating the Privileges and Immunities Clause 82 and the dormant Commerce Clause.' 8 3
On a challenge based on Congress's General Welfare Clause power, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the Agricultural Adjustment Act, which provided federal processing and floor stock tax assessments on basic agricultural commodities.1 84 The Court reasoned that Congress had overstepped its taxing power under the General Welfare Clause because it invaded the reserved power of the States by regulating agricultural production within the States. 88 Despite striking the Act down, the Court acknowledged that Congress does have an expansive power to tax for the general welfare. 8 6 Occasionally States have challenged federal regulations that are effectively taxes, arguing that they violate the Tenth Amendment's assurance of State sovereignty.' 8 7 In one case, the Supreme Court In the area of a State's authority to tax within its own borders, taxpayers have frequently challenged State governments for discriminating between residents and nonresidents under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.1 90 For example, in Toomer v. Witsell,191 the Supreme Court struck down one licensing fee on nonresident shrimp boat owners imposed at a rate a hundred times greater than resident owners because the State failed to demonstrate a unique link between the State's conservation interests and the discriminatory fee measures. 19 2 Generally speaking, any State seeking to tax nonresidents must do so in "substantial equality" to how its residents are taxed.1 9 3 An example of an individual successfully invoking the Privileges and Immunities Clause in a tax discrimination case is Lunding.' 9 4 There, the Supreme Court struck down a New York statute that prevented nonresidents from deducting alimony payments. 9 5 This resulted in a greater tax liability for a nonresident than that for a similarly situated resident.' 9 6 The Court explained that although the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not demand precise equality, New York had failed to offer a substantial justification for the tax discrimination.1 9 7
Tax subsidies to encourage investment within a State could theoretically be challenged under the dormant Commerce Clause,1 9 8 a doctrine that limits a State's ability to interfere with interstate com- (4th ed. 2001). The four requirements are: 1) the activity must be sufficiently connected to the state to justify a tax; 2) the tax must be fairly apportioned; 3) the tax must not discriminate against interstate commerce; and 4) the tax must be fairly related to benefits provided to the taxpayer. Taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the taxpayer nor a liability which he assumed by contract. It is but a way of apportioning the cost of government among those who in some measure are privileged to enjoy its benefits and must bear its burdens. Since no citizen enjoys immunity from that burden, its retroactive imposition does not necessarily infringe due process .... . 217 The Majority went on to rule that retroactively applied tax law amendments are permissible unless the changes are "so harsh and oppressive as to transgress the constitutional limitation. tax amendments, requiring that the changes merely further some rational legislative purpose. 219 Taxpayers had some limited success in the 1920s challenging tax legislation that instituted, retroactively, the federal estate and gift tax. Shortly after Congress introduced these taxes, the Supreme Court sustained due process challenges to the retroactive application of both. 2 20 In concluding that retroactive imposition of the gift tax conflicted with Fifth Amendment due process rights, the Court suggested that the taxpayer's inability to alter past behavior to avoid or lessen the effect of the newly enacted and retroactively-applied tax was relevant to the due process analysis. 22 1 Since these cases were decided, however, several courts have noted that concerns about a taxpayer's ability to foresee changes in the tax laws and a taxpayer's inability to alter his or her behavior accordingly are relevant primarily in the case of newly enacted taxes, rather than retroactive amendments to an existing tax. In a more recent challenge to the constitutionality of retroactive estate tax legislation, United States v. Carlton, 2 23 the Supreme Court applied the same standard as in the case of income taxes, ruling that as long as the retroactive legislation furthered some "legitimate legislative purpose," the due process challenge would fail.
2 2 4 The Majority opinion also rejected the taxpayer's claims of detrimental reliance on existing law. According to the Majority, reliance on existing law is an insufficient basis for a constitutional challenge because a citizen has no vested interest in the tax laws. The IRC is filled with exclusions, deductions, credits, and tax rate reductions that favor certain taxpayers, investments, and business activities over others. 228 The deduction for interest paid on debt used to acquire a personal residence, for example, benefits homeowners when compared with taxpayers who rent. 229 Reduced tax rates on capital gain income, the child tax credit, and the exclusion from gross income for certain scholarships are among the hundreds of subsidies that currently exist in the tax code. 23 0 While most policymakers decry these widely applicable special tax benefits as economically inefficient, Congress has made little effort since 1986 to curtail their enactment.
1
More troubling are tax preferences that benefit or provide transitional relief to one or only a few taxpayers. Often referred to as "loophole," "ad hoc," or "rifle shot" provisions, their enactment is not a new phenomenon. One of the most famous taxpayer-specific relief provisions was section 1240 of the IRC of 1954,232 known as the Mayer amendment, which granted tax relief for retirement plan distribu-tions tailored specifically for Louis B. Mayer, the then-retiring head of the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer movie studio. 2 33 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 contained hundreds of narrowly tailored tax relief provisions, including a provision intended to grant special treatment to supporters of the University of Texas. The text of the statute limited relief to Commentators have suggested numerous theories to explain why lawmakers are willing to enact narrowly tailored tax provisions. These explanations range from simple observations about the influence of special interest lobbying groups 2 36 to complex examinations of public choice theory.
7
The courts have had little opportunity to comment on the constitutionality of narrowly tailored tax benefits. One major roadblock to judicial review is the question of standing. In Apache Bend Apartments, Ltd. v. United States, 2 38 the Fifth Circuit denied standing to plaintiffs who brought suit against the United States challenging on equal protection grounds the constitutionality of several narrowlydrawn transition relief provisions in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 239 The plaintiffs in Apache sought injunctive relief to prevent implementation of the 1986 Act; in effect, asking the court to deny the tax benefits to those who received them. the plaintiffs' claims of unfair treatment as an attempt to challenge the tax liability of those taxpayers who received the tax benefit, rather than an effort to contest their own tax liability.
2 4 0 According to the Court, the plaintiffs' allegations of unequal treatment presented "abstract questions of wide public significance which amount to generalized grievance" that are more appropriately addressed by Congress. Instead of seeking to deny tax benefits to those narrow classes of taxpayers who received them, as the plaintiffs did in Apache, what if the taxpayer's requested relief is an extension of the special tax benefit to themselves? In that case, the Anti-Injunction Act, which prohibits suits against the Government seeking to enjoin the collection of tax, likely would apply.
2 4 2 Thus, given the Anti-Injunction Act and the lack of standing to challenge tax breaks given to others, it appears unlikely that a taxpayer could contest Congress's grant of special tax relief even if, on the merits, a viable equal protection or other constitutional claim might be made.
CONCLUSION
Upon close examination, many provisions of the U.S. Constitution could, theoretically, restrict the legislative power to tax. And taxpayers have, in fact, attempted to use almost every protection afforded by the Constitution to defeat tax legislation. These challenges, however, are rarely successful primarily because of the willingness of courts to defer to the legislature on tax issues. This has led to the observation that there may be two Constitutions, "one for taxes and one for all other matters." 
